Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics by Arras, John D.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 69 | Issue 4 Article 5
Fall 1994
Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in
Bioethics
John D. Arras
Barnard College
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arras, John D. (1994) "Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 69 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol69/iss4/5
Principles and Particularity:
The Roles of Cases in Bioethics
JOHN D. ARRAS*
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, when I was a graduate student in philosophy, the
study of ethics had fallen on hard times. Some of the leading exponents of
ethical theory had succeeded, for the time being, in showing either that all
ethical judgments were reducible to emotive reactions-and hence irrational
and indefensible'-or that the study of ethics, properly understood, had more
to do with probing the nuances of the "language of morals"2 than with
reflecting on the normative moral experience of real people in their mundane
or professional capacities. The study of ethics had become a rarefied,
specialized, technical, and, above all, dry discipline. Given the sad state of the
field, many had begun to wonder whether political philosophy was dead. To
be sure, books and articles continued to be written, and courses continued to
be taught, but for many of us at the time such behaviors might have
resembled the residual motions of patients in a persistent vegetative state
more than genuine signs of life. The real "action" in philosophy lay
elsewhere, around the "linguistic turn"3 or in continental theory, but certainly
not in ethics.
Not coincidentally, during my undergraduate and graduate years I was never
exposed to anything remotely resembling a "case study" in ethics. If ethics
was ever to establish itself as an intellectual enterprise worthy of respect,
students were told, it would "have to ignore the grubby world of everyday
moral concerns and concentrate instead on theory, abstraction, and the
meaning of various moral terms.4 In my work today, however, I am mired in
cases, both at the hospital, where the exigencies of clinical problems preclude
leisurely invocations of philosophical theory, and even in my university
classes on bioethics and the philosophy of law. This Article inquires how this
dramatic shift from theory-driven to case-driven ethics came about and
* Division of Bioethics, Montefiore Medical Center/Albert Einstein College of Medicine,
Department of Philosophy, Barnard College. Ph.D., 1972, Northwestern University. The author thanks
Jeffrey Blustein and Norman Care for helpful discussions, and Richard Miller and Susan Williams for
stimulating commentary at this symposium.
1. See, e.g., ALFRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1946); C.L. STEVENSON,
ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944).
2. R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1972 reprint).
3. THE LINGUIsTIc TURN (Richard Rorty ed., 1967).
4. Felicitous exceptions in my own education were the courses of Professor Henry B. Veatch,
which, while not "applied" in the contemporary sense, were rooted in the normative quest for goods and
virtues.
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attempts to chart some of its implications for the practice and teaching of
ethics.
I. EXAMPLES IN THE SERVICE OF THEORY
Although neither classical nor contemporary moral philosophers dealt with
what is now called a "case study," they frequently cited examples designed to
substantiate their theoretical points. Thus, Mill deployed the example of
someone inciting an angry mob poised on the corn dealer's doorstep in
connection with his theory of the limits of free expression;5 and Kant
mentioned, less helpfully, examples of honest dealing, suicide, and failure to
develop one's talents as illustrations of his "categorical imperative. '6 The
partisans of "linguistic ethics" would also occasionally cite an example of
moral behavior, though these tended to be uniformly unimaginative and
trivial.7
There was, .to be sure, an occasional philosophical example sketched with
some detail and literary flair, such as Sartre's memorable reference to a young
man tragically torn between the incompatible demands of caring for his
mother and joining the Free French struggle against fascism.8 Indeed, Sartre
produced not merely a few apt examples, but also a remarkable literary corpus
of novels and dramatic works, much of which was self-consciously devoted
to the illustration of the philosopher's theories of freedom, identity, and
responsibility.9
The common thread uniting these examples, both the trivial and the tragic,
is their subservience to philosophical theory. The philosophers' examples and
hypotheticals were designed to make theoretical points, not to shed light on
various moral problems independently articulated by practical people
enmeshed in the realities of everyday personal and professional life. Indeed,
to the proponents of linguistic ethics, the true task of moral philosophy simply
involved the clarification of moral language; while, to the philosophical
emotivist, the yearning for a normative theory of responsibility or justice
stemmed from a failure to acknowledge the non-cognitive status of all moral
values. The ethical concerns of spouses, lovers, parents, legislators, workers,
revolutionaries, doctors, nurses, lawyers, and social workers thus were
condescendingly delegated to parties occupying lower rungs on the
5. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (David Stitz ed., 1975).
6. IMMANUEL KANT, KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 89-90 (H.J. Paton
trans., 1961).
7. Indeed, a review of the ethics literature produced in the 1950's and 1960's could easily give
a present-day reader the impression that civilization had in those days been brought to its knees by
hordes of ruthless pedestrians bent on violating posted warnings not to trespass on the grass.
8. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, L'EXIsTENTIALISME EST UN HUMANISME (1946). For another memorable
example of a story in the service of philosophy, see SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING
(1843).
9. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, WHAT is LITERATURE? (1948). Typical examples of Sartre's philosophical
fiction include the novel, LA NAUstE (1938), and such plays as LES MOUCHES (1941) and HUIs CLOS
(1944).
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academic/intellectual food chain, such as journalists, ministers, and
politicians." In view of this cleavage between the goals of moral philosophy
and the practical world, it is not surprising that the practice and teaching of
ethics did not refer to case studies.
II. THE RISE OF "APPLIED ETHICS"
The current revival of interest in "practical ethics"-that is, the use of the
concepts and methods of ethical theory towards the resolution of concrete
moral problems-is generally credited to the publication of John Rawls'
monumental work, A Theory of Justice." For serious intellectuals struggling
with issues of race and the moral dilemmas occasioned by the Vietnam war,
Rawls' book rekindled hope that reason-rather than emotion, custom, or
sheer political force-might be fruitfully applied to clarify and resolve real
ethical-political problems in public life. Although Rawls' book was exclusive-
ly concerned with the explanation and justification of a morally ideal
blueprint for just social institutions, and even though it contained no actual
case studies and few examples of how his theory might be applied, 2 A
Theory of Justice nevertheless generated a heady optimism regarding the
potential of moral theory to solve real world problems. In no time, it seemed,
a fledgling "industry" had been launched, complete with its own journals and
think-tanks. For those working in the field at that time, it seemed that the
rational, definitive resolution of some of the most vexing social conflicts
merely awaited the proper formulation and application of the best ethical
theory that moral philosophy could provide. 3 The heyday of "applied ethics"
had dawned.
Different styles of moral analysis eventually emerged under this rubric of
applied ethics. By far the most theoretically confident, and the most
problematic style might be described as a kind of moral deductivism.' 4
10. See STEVENSON, supra note 1, at 1:
The purpose of an analytic or methodological study, whether of science or of ethics, is always
indirect. It hopes to send others to their tasks with clearer heads and less wasteful habits of
investigation. This necessitates a continual scrutiny of what these others are doing, or else
analysis of meanings and methods will proceed in a vacuum; but it does not require the
analyst, as such, to participate in the inquiry that he analyzes. In ethics any direct participation
of this sort might have its dangers. It might deprive the analysis of its detachment and distort
a relatively neutral study into a plea for some special code of morals. So although normative
questions constitute by far the most important branch of ethics, pervading all of common-sense
life, and occupying most of the professional attention of legislators, editorialists, didactic
novelists, clergymen, and moral philosophers, these questions must here be left unanswered.
The present volume has the limited task of sharpening the tools which others employ.
As we shall soon see, the above project is the exact opposite of contemporary casuistry in every detail.
11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
12. Rawls' only deviation from the development of so-called "ideal theory" concerned the
conditions for justifying the practice of civil disobedience. Id. at 333-91.
13. For example, see RONALD M. DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977).
14. Just as H.L.A. Hart discovered the difficulty of tracking down actual specimens of the legal
realists' bite noire, the advocates of so-called "mechanical jurisprudence," so is it hard to pin down
actual exemplars of so-called deductivistic bioethics. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1958). A deductivistic approach is certainly implied in a
1994]
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According to this approach, the task of the "applied philosopher" was to start
with a philosophical theory-presumably, the best and most comprehensive
account available-then to develop various mid-level normative principles,
such as those bearing on truth-telling, paternalism, and confidentiality. With
the theory and derivative principles firmly in place, the practical philosopher
needed only to feed the relevant factual data into the moral equation to yield
the appropriate moral conclusion. 5
For reasons that shall be explained presently, this sort of deductivistic
appeal to comprehensive moral theory found few adherents, especially among
professionals seeking the advice of the applied ethicist. However, a far more
theoretically modest approach, focusing on the development, application, and
refinement of a small set of mid-level principles, was to prove spectacularly
successful. This "principlist" approach (or "bioethical mantra") 6 posited the
existence of objective, universal principles that ought to govern moral
behavior, social policy, and legislation. Developed and popularized by
philosophers Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, 7 this approach soon
became the dominant paradigm for serious work in bioethics.
In contrast to the reductionistic tendencies of the more hard-core variety of
applied ethicists, principlists neglected ultimate or foundational questions in
favor of a more pluralistic and "intuitionistic" approach. The partisans of
applied moral theory tended to reduce the sources of normative criticism to
a single, overarching value (for example, Kantian respect for persons or the
maximization of utility) that would then definitively settle all conflicts
between values and principles. The principlists settled for a small cluster of
disparate fundamental values (autonomy, beneficence, nonmalificence, and
justice), no one of which was granted a priori primacy over the others.
The relationship between these mid-level principles and cases within the
theory of principlism has been somewhat ambiguous and subject to historical
fluctuation. The basic question is whether one ought to conceive this
relationship in uni-directional or in dialectical terms. As a uni-directional
relationship, one can hold either that judgments about cases are entirely
determined by appeal to governing principles or that principles are merely
derivative "summary formulations" of incremental judgments about cases. As
a dialectical relationship; one can claim that principles both shape and are
shaped by the responses to particular cases. According to this latter interpreta-
tion, principles would retain normative dominion over what ought to be done
much-quoted chart in TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
32 (1st ed. 1979), that plots the path of ethical justification from cases to rules to principles to theory.
Perhaps the philosophers whose works come closest to a highly theory-laden, deductivist approach are
H. TRISTRAM ENGLEHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICs (1986), and PETER SINGER,
PRACTICAL ETHICS (1979).
15. Implicit in this approach was a rather clear-cut division of labor: the applied philosopher was
the expert with regard to moral theory and practical reasoning, while "the facts" would be furnished by
others, such as physicians, social workers, or business executives.
16. I believe I might have actually coined this derogatory epithet at a lecture on "Methodology in
Bioethics" at the University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, 1986.
17. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 14.
[Vol. 69:983
ROLE OF CASES 1N BIOETHICS
in specific circumstances, while the developing intuitive responses to cases
would add content to principles and help formulate their proper boundaries.
During the early, heroic phase of applied ethics, the principlists were
partisans of a decidedly "top down" orientation devoted to applying principles
to the moral data of concrete cases.'s Moral objectivity and justification were
found, not in the messy details of the cases, but rather in "the principles of
bioethics." Although many clinicians continued to complain that even this
more modest version of applied ethics was too abstract to be well suited to
clinical decision-making, many others viewed principlism as a source of
objective moral knowledge and useful advice. These physicians tended to view
the bioethicist as a kind of "moral expert," and as a purveyor of "principled"
moral judgments.
During this early period in the development of bioethics as a field, the case
study emerged as an object of serious consideration. At first, case studies
were often employed in the traditional manner as illustrations of how a
particular ethical theory might bear on moral problems. For example, a case
involving the use of placebos in medical research would be used as a prism
through which to view the salient features of Kantian or rule-utilitarian
reasoning. Many, however, increasingly used case studies not just as
illustrations, but as objects of interest in their own right. Case studies posed
intellectual and moral problems that called for a solution. It was important to
get the right (or at least an acceptable) answer, not simply in order to exhibit
the properties of one's favorite theory, but to help determine the fates of
living, breathing individuals, many of whom posed moral dilemmas 6f
excruciating difficulty. The moral philosopher was fast becoming an "applied
ethicist," and the ethicist was no longer an isolated theorist, but was now
enmeshed in the problems, dilemmas, and crises of professional life. Indeed,
the theorist was well on his or her way to becoming a consultant, moving
from being a detached observer to a player in the professionals' drama.
The case studies that developed in the literature of this period shared two
salient features. First, professionals tended to define them."' Second, the case
studies were brief and "thin." Except for legal cases, the cases presented for
consideration in the bioethics literature rarely exceeded a few paragraphs.
Crucial medical facts (for example, the patient's diagnosis, options, and
prognosis as affected by various treatment choices) would be presented, the
shape of the ethical quandary would be sketched, and the care provider's
position clarified. Such cases seldom painted a more fleshed out portrait of
18. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
19. Recall the established division of intellectual labor within the applied ethics movement. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text. The philosopher/ethicists would be responsible for the application
of theory and principles, while the factual "case material" would be provided by doctors, nurses, or
social workers. The problems thus tended to be shaped according to the conceptual, axiologic, and
linguistic frameworks of the caregivers. A good example of this phenomenon is the packaging of
difficult issues in obstetrics under the heading of "matemal/fetal conflicts." Although I disagree with
those who would deny or minimize the possibility for such conflicts, I think that this way of framing
many of these issues obscures other conflicts (for example, maternal/professional) and often ignores or
legitimates unjust or discriminatory background conditions of the conflicts.
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the various actors and the implications of the choices before them. The
audience of such case studies often had extremely limited information about,
for example, the patients' perception of their disease and the meaning of
treatment options as mediated by their social and family history, race,
economic class, prior medical encounters, and psychological characteristics.
A typical example of this "bare bones" approach to case studies, drawn
from the experience of my colleague Nancy Dubler, might have gone
something like this:
The medical housestaff at a public hospital in the Bronx confronts a
difficult case involving a "problem patient." Mr. Jones is an IV drug user
who also happens to be infected with HIV and tuberculosis. The TB has
been diagnosed as being of the multi-drug resistant variety, and thus poses
a serious threat of potentially lethal infection to anyone coming into casual
contact with Mr. Jones. The problem is that the patient insists upon leaving
his room so he can be free to wander the corridors and lobby of the
hospital. The staff are extremely upset and worried that these expeditions
outside of his room will lead to the infection of other patients, caregivers,
or hospital visitors.
As presented, this case poses a conflict among the patient's individual
rights, the public's legitimate interest in protection from harm, and the
hospital's fiduciary obligations to its patients and employees. Where should
the line be drawn between civil liberties and public health? Would it be
ethically justifiable to lock the patient in his room against his will? I shall
return to this case later in this Article.
III. THE DECLINE OF THEORY IN BIOETHICS
Notwithstanding the initial wave of enthusiasm that followed in the wake
of Rawls' theory of justice, attempts to yoke moral theory into the service of
practical ethics were destined to founder on philosophers' ambivalence and on
the intrinsic limitations of ethical theory for practical purposes.
While some applied ethicists immediately embraced the role of practical
consultant to professional colleagues,20 many ethical theorists continued,
even during the salad days of applied ethics, to view the application of moral
theory primarily as a vehicle for enriching philosophical moral theory.2'
Thus, even when they were ostensibly addressing a medical audience, many
philosophers appeared more concerned with how other philosophers and
theorists of medicine would receive their views. Indeed, many philosophers
working in ethics during this period were profoundly ambivalent towards
applying their theories to practical affairs. While the revival of normative
ethical theory in the 1970's was to a great extent fuelled by philosophers'
expectations of "making a difference in the real world," many of these same
20. See, e.g., Albert R. Jonsen, Can an Ethicist Be a Consultant?, in FRONTIERS IN MEDICAL
ETHICS 157 (Virginia Abernethy ed., 1980).
21. Good examples of this ambivalently practical and heavily theory-laden work in ethics can be
found in such journals as Philosophy & Public Affairs and Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
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theorists instinctively recoiled at the thought of becoming mere "moral valets"
in the service of some other profession.' Their work was thus "theory
driven" in yet another sense: in addition to being governed by the application
of philosophical or theological theories, their work had been yoked primarily
to the service of ethical theorizing as an activity in its own right. Needless to
say, clinicians had very little use for this genre of applied ethics.
Although most philosophers working in this field would eventually
overcome their residual discomfort with the practical domain, variants of
applied ethics based primarily on the invocation of philosophical ethical
theory were doomed to fail for reasons internal to such a project. Recall that
the "theory driven" model assumes that the proper task for the applied ethicist
is to assemble all the relevant ethical theories, with their corresponding
principles and likely implications for a particular case, and deploy them for
those seeking the ethicist's counsel. But what then? Two possibilities suggest
themselves.
First, the ethicist could offer advice in the vein of a "Consumer Reports"
service:23 "Well, in this situation a Kantian would do 'X,' a utilitarian would
promote 'Y,' and a natural rights theorist would advocate 'Z."' Needless to
say, such "advice" might not prove enormously helpful to those doctors,
nurses, and social workers who haven't yet quite figured out where they stand
in the ongoing debate between the partisans of Kant, Mill, and Locke.
Second, the ethicist could attempt to vindicate her favored theory and then
apply it to the case at hand. The obvious problem with this gambit is the
seemingly interminable nature of philosophical argument about the founda-
tions of morals. To put the point bluntly, after more than two thousand years
of ethical debate among philosophers with rival views, no clear winner has
emerged, and clinicians cannot be blamed for doubting that one ever will. As
eminently practical people, they cannot afford the luxury of awaiting the
development of an ethical theory capable of routing this contentious field by
force of argument alone.
Even if the theory-driven applied ethicist were miraculously to establish the
philosophical supremacy of a single, comprehensive theory of morals, her
project would have foundered on the emergence of disagreements among
adherents to that very theory. Thus, a utilitarian would have to worry not
merely about the challenges posed by rival theories, but also about profound
intramural disagreements among adherents to the theory of utility. What shall
count as the true meaning of "utility?" How will it be measured? Which form
of utilitarianism (for example, act or rule) is correct? These seemingly
intractable questions, along with many more, would continue to vex even the
champions of the dominant ethical theory before they could begin to apply
their doctrine to cases.
22. See Annette Baier's translation of Hegel's phrase, "Kammerdiener der Moralitft." Annette Baler,
Doing Without Moral Theory?, in POSTURES OF THE MIND 228, 236 (Annette Baier ed., 1985).
23. See id.
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Suppose further that, per impossibile, philosophers could agree upon both
the-general outlines of the correct theory as well as on its precise formulation.
Even with the unlikely advent of this particular millennium, theorists would
still be unable to provide clinicians and policy experts with unambiguous
moral solutions derived from the theory. This is because many disputes in
clinical bioethics and health policy turn, not on theoretical differences, but on
such nettlesome issues as the value that should be accorded to different forms
of human and animal life, the factual prediction of likely consequences, and
the most rational attitude towards risk.
The problem of active euthanasia provides a good illustration of all three
problems. Theorists who agree entirely on the moral theory level may yet part
company on the crucial issue of how we should value biological human
life.24 Even theorists who agree on that difficult question may disagree on
the likelihood of bad consequences ensuing from a shift towards a more
permissive policy and on the question of who should bear the burden of
proof.25
The more theory-driven approaches to applied ethics suffer a further
liability embedded in widespread notions of what an ethical theory ought to
look like. The common wisdom is that an ethical theory ought to be a large
body of ethical propositions derivable from one or a few basic moral
principles. When people speak of ethical theory in this way, they are usually
thinking of some version of Kantian deontology, 26  utilitarianism," or
Lockean natural rights:2 8 The theorists who support these different ethical
theories are responding to the question, "What is the rational foundation of
moral philosophy?" As philosophers such as Thomas Nagel, Bernard
Williams, and Charles Taylor have convincingly argued, however, this
enterprise is problematic.29 It assumes that the chiaroscuro of our moral
experience can be reduced to one or two overarching sources of moral value,
such as maximization of happiness or respect for human freedom. While such
an assumption is likely to please theorists bent upon achieving simplicity and
efficiency, it will not do justice to the rich diversity inherent in the moral
lives of individuals and societies. Consequently, even if the proponents of
theory were to agree upon a moral theory so defined, and even if they could
apply unambiguously the theory to concrete moral problems, the end result of
24. RONALD M. DWORKiN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993).
25. See, for example, the contrasting views of Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs
Amok, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 52; and Margaret P. Battin, Voluntary Euthanasia
and the Risks of Abuse: Can We Learn Anything from the Netherlands?, L. MED. & HEALTH CARE,
Spring-Summer 1992, at 133.
26. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Oskar Priest ed. &
Lewis W. Beck trans., 1959); RAwLs, supra note 11.
27. See, e.g., JOHN S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1910); SINGER, supra note 14.
28. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); ENGLEHARDT, supra note
14.
29. THOMAS NAbEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND 129 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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this reductivist enterprise would still leave us with an impoverished under-
standing of the problems, solutions, and sources of moral value.
IV. PRINCIPLISM UNDER SIEGE
As I have shown, the "principlist" version of applied ethics was able to
virtually corner the methodological market in bioethics by abandoning the
foundationalist pretensions of reductionist ethical theory while elaborating a
network of principles that offered the hope, or at least the appearance, of
ethical objectivity. Without having to bother with the Sisyphusian task of
grounding their ethical judgments in ultimate theoretical norms, clinicians
could pronounce them justified by appealing to such objective and universal
principles as autonomy, beneficence, and justice. By the late 1980's, however,
this approach to practical ethics was coming under fire from two diametrically
opposed camps.
A. Principlism Not Theoretical Enough
From one flank, the partisans of a comprehensive philosophical theory
attacked principlism for its relative insouciance regarding first principles, °
that is, for not being theoretical enough. This group of critics found especially
galling principlism's inability or unwillingness to provide a rationally
defensible framework for settling conflicts between competing principles.
Clearly, the critics had a point. Utilitarians or Rawlsians, unlike principlists,
could settle, at least to their own satisfaction, the inevitable conflicts of the
moral life through appealing to some overarching principle of "lexical
ordering."'" The principlists forthrightly admitted that the moral principles
came with no pre-established theoretical weights and, consequently, that
conflicts arising among these principles would have to be settled through a
subtle process of weighing and balancing in medias res.32 Although the
partisans of theory find this approach to conflict resolution to be unacceptably
subjective or "intuitionistic,"33 there is wisdom in the principlists' modesty.
Their critics have neither established the clear superiority of any monistic
theory, such as utilitarianism, nor have they produced a convincing account
of why within more pluralistic systems certain lexically favored values, such
as utility or liberty, should always prevail over all other competing values in
a myriad of convoluted real world situations.
30. K. Danner Clouser & Bernard Gert, A Critique of Principlism, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 219 (1990);
Ronald M. Green, Method in Bioethics: A Troubled Assessment, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 179 (1990).
31. Utilitarians are supposed to resolve all such conflicts by bringing them under the common
metric of "utility." Rawlsians give moral priority to liberty in conflicts with "welfare." See RAWLS,
supra note 11.
32. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 51 (3d ed.
1989).
33. RAWLS, supra note 11, at 34-40.
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B. Principlism Too Mechanistic
From the opposite flank, the partisans of a more case-driven approach to
practical ethics began to attack principlism for being too formal, mechanistic,
and deductive. Although the 'nuanced ethical analyses of its founding
expositors were anything but simplistic or mechanistic, principlism's epigones,
many of whom lacked even the equivalent of "basic training" in ethics, often
did convey the impression that one merely had to slap one or more principles
on a given set of facts to derive the morally correct result. More often than
not, their "method" was to recite what each of the principles seemed to
require, even if they conflicted with one another, then simply to announce a
conclusion. Allusions to the "bioethical mantra" were in large- measure a
reaction to precisely this kind of bastardized principlism.
1. From Deductivism to Reflective Equilibrium
The broad-based dissatisfaction with the regnant paradigm harbored two
more serious contentions about principlism and its way of configuring the
relationship between principles and case judgments. First, the partisans of
casuistry or case-based reasoning objected to the apparently uni-directional
movement from principles to cases within principlism.34 A careful analysis
of Beauchamp and Childress' early editions of Principles of Biomedical
Ethics" might suggest a more complicated relationship between principles
and cases in the process of moral justification, but an oft-cited chart in that
book gave the distinct impression that theory justified principles, that
principles justified moral rules, and that rules justified moral judgments in
particular cases.36 According to the critics, this uni-directional picture
distorted or totally ignored the pivotal role of intuitive, case-based judgments
of right and wrong. To be sure, the judgments in question were not to be
confused with just any responses to cases, no matter how prejudiced, ill-
considered, or subject to coercion they might be. Rather, the critics had
something in mind more akin to John Rawls' notion of "considered" moral
judgments'-the judgments about whose genesis and moral rectitude we feel
most confident, such as our sense that slavery is wrong. It is precisely these
judgments, they claimed, that give concrete meaning, definition, and scope to
moral principles and that provide critical leverage in refining their articula-
tion.
The critics were claiming, in effect, that principles and cases have a
dialectical or reciprocal relationship. The principles provide normative
guidance, the cases provide considered judgments. The considered judgments,
in turn, help shape the principles that then provide more precise guidance for
34. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988).
35. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (2d ed.
1983).
36. Id. at 5.
37. See RAwLs, supra note 11, at 47-48.
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more complex or difficult cases. Following Rawls' terminology, principles and
cases exist together in creative tension or "reflective equilibrium."3 8
The principlists responded to this line of criticism by simply embracing it,
over time, with increasing forthrightness and enthusiasm. Although they may
have been slower than others to discern the formative and critical roles of
case analysis with regard to principles and theories, Beauchamp and Childress
now embrace reflective equilibrium as the methodology of principlism and
emphatically denounce deductivism for precisely the same reasons given by
their critics.3 9 One can view principles as the primary substance of ethical
analysis, they conclude, without being a deductivist.
2. Principlism, Indeterminacy, and Moral Justification
A large part of the initial appeal of principlism lay in its promise of
providing principled solutions to moral problems, solutions that could claim
to be more than the "merely subjective" biases of practitioners or consultants.
As one physician-graduate of the Kennedy Institute's week-long bioethics
seminar explained to me, "This [method] is what our student-doctors need.
It's really objective, based on principles, just like a science." This promise of
objectivity appeared to be based on the expectation that individual actions or
social policies could be justified by applying the enumerated principles.
In some very simple moral situations consisting, for example, of a clear and
uncontested moral rule and a fact pattern that contradicts it, this promise
could be vindicated. Suppose, for example, that a physician decides to lie to
her patient in order to improve his spirits and possibly facilitate his recovery.
One could say that this doctor's act violates the principle of autonomy and the
law of informed consent. Indeed, one could deploy reasoning in this case as
a deductive syllogism: "It is wrong to lie to patients. Dr. Jones has told a lie.
Therefore, Dr. Jones has done something wrong."
The problem, of course, is that even in a simple, straightforward case, this
reasoning has suppressed a conflicting principle-the principle of beneficence.
This is precisely the principle that Dr. Jones would appeal to should she try
to defend her lie. ("I did it for his benefit. I was just following my Hippocrat-
ic impulses!") At first glance, this opposing principle may not be noticeable
because the principle of autonomy has prevailed within the biomedical ethics
community over the principle of beneficence in this type of case. One should
remember, however, that the predominance of the autonomy principle was not
always this clear, that the debate between autonomy and paternalistic medicine
rages on in other countries,4" and that the eventual victory of autonomy in
38. Id. at 48-51. Rawls' notion of reflective equilibrium, somewhat sketchily drawn in his book,
is clarified and defended in Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in
Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256 (1979).
39. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th ed.
1994).
40. See Nicholas A. Christakis, The Ethical Design of an AIDS Vaccine Trial in Africa, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June-July 1988, at 31; Antonella Surbone, Letter from Italy: Truth Telling to the Patient,
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the areas of truth-telling and informed consent, at least in theory, was won
after a protracted ideological struggle." As a result, the biomedical commu-
nity now assigns much greater weight to respecting patients than to easing
their psychological burdens.
Principlism may provide the kind of moral justification sought in the easy
cases, but what about the complicated cases in which battles between
competing principles continue to rage-the cases in which clinicians and
policy-makers seek the advice of bioethicists? The "tough" cases will
inevitably present not one clear-cut and uncontested principle, but rather two
or more conflicting values that require some sort of reconciliation. Precisely
what kind of moral justification can principlism offer in the face of serious
moral ambiguity and conflict? To what extent does the "application of
principles" actuallyjustify the moral choices that we make, both individually
and collectively?
Another way to formulate these questions is to ask about the capacity of
principlism to generate determinate answers to moral quandaries. Doubts
about the justificatory power of principlism's principles arise on several levels
of moral reflection.
Interpreting the principles. The principles themselves require a great deal
of interpretation and ordering before.they can begin to shape the conclusion
of a moral argument. The bioethical literature abounds with superficial claims
to the effect that "the principle of autonomy (or of beneficence, or of the 'best
interest' of the patient) requires that we do such and such." The problem with
this common formulation is that it ignores the difficulty (or the vacuousness)
of passing immediately from very abstract statements of principle to very
concrete conclusions about what to do here and now. Quite apart from the
vexing problem of rank-ordering competing principles in morally complex
situations, a problem I shall treat separately, one first must determine exactly
what these abstract formulations of principle actually mean.
What does it mean, for example, to invoke the "best interests" principle in
the case of a severely impaired newborn? What content can one give to this
expression? How are the interests of such a child to be assessed, and
according to which conception of the good?42 Some might argue that a
vitalist's conception of the good should shape our understanding of the child's
interests; others might advocate a hedonistic conception of the good that
would restrict the notion of interests to the qualia of pleasure and pain; while
still others might advance a conception of the good based on conceptions of
268 JAMA 1661 (1992). A recent television documentary provided a riveting portrayal of cultural
differences regarding the practice of truth-telling. The physicians and nurses in a Japanese cancer ward
were shown grappling with a cultural surd: a cancer patient who not only wanted to know the truth
about her cofidition, but actually had the unbridled temerity to talk to other patients about their common
plight. Their temporary solution: send the woman on lots of long walks in the hospital gardens! See The
Art of Healing (David Grubin Productions, Inc. & Public Affairs Television, Inc.), reproduced in
Healing and the Mind: The Art of Healing (Ambrose Video Publishing, Inc. 1993).
41. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
42. See EZEKIEL J. EMANUAL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL ETHICS IN A LIBERAL POLITY
(1991).
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human flourishing and dignity, which might lead to nontreatment decisions
even in the absence of pain and suffering.
Whatever the merit of these individual suggestions, the point is that unless
one interprets "the principles of bioethics," they will merely play the role of
empty "chapter headings,' 43 doing little if any actual work in moral analysis.
Unless one furnishes principles with a definite shape and content, they will
merely lend a patina of objectivity to bioethical debates while masking the
need to make arguments and choices regarding the substance of those
principles. 4
It is important to recall that the meaning of principles is shaped, not simply
by explicit and constructive ethical theorizing, but also by the largely implicit
influences of culture.4 5 The seemingly univocal "principle of autonomy" will
mean different things and have different weights in different cultural settings.
Compare, for example, the way in which the right of reproductive self-
determination functions in the abortion debates of the United States and
Germany. In this country, longstanding legal traditions of rugged individual-
ism have yielded, albeit after many years of bloody and ongoing conflict, a
right that has been aptly characterized as nearly absolute but entirely
asocial.4 6 So while a woman's claims to (nearly) absolute personal sover-
eignty have trumped the interests of husbands, parents, and the values of a
large countervailing segment of the community, women remain largely
isolated in their freedom, unsupported by the community's resources and
concern. In Germany, by contrast, the principle of autonomy exercises
considerable force, to be sure, but its meaning and scope have been mediated
by a public philosophy, traceable back to Rousseau, that stresses the
complimentary nature of individual freedom and social responsibility. Thus,
Germans significantly curtail, by American standards, a woman's right to
obtain an abortion, but Geiman women who obtain abortions are given
community services and abortion funding.47 Such differences in the presenta-
tion of various principles in diverse cultural settings have prompted Mary Ann
Glendon to speak, not of "rights talk" tout court, but rather of different "rights
dialects. 4 8
Interpreting conflicting principles. In hard cases, principles conflict. That
is why they are hard. Can principlism provide a means to justify resolutions
to moral conflict? What help can principlism provide, for example, when the
principle of autonomy is at odds with the so-called "harm principle," as in
cases involving maternal-fetal conflict or cases involving decisions to
43. See Clouser & Gert, supra note 30, at 221.
44. Precisely the same critical point can be made with regard to the other "principles of bioethics."
"The" principle of justice is, if anything, a highly contested concept, not a univocal principle. In the
words of Alasdair Maclntyre, one might well ask, "Whose Justice, Which Rationality?" See generally
ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
45. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
46. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 55-
61(1991).
47. Id. at 61-66.
48. Id.
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reproduce in a context of genetic disease or AIDS? According to the
principlists, the only available remedy for such conflicts of principle is to
judiciously weigh and balance the competing moral claims as they arise in
different circumstances.49 If a woman is overwrought and her judgment
skewed by excessive fear and faulty reasoning, and if her choice would
impose severe and irreparable harm on her offspring, then a principlist might
find the harm principle to outweigh the claims of self-determination.
This weighing and balancing, some critics contend, is inherently subjective
and unpredictable." Suppose two observers-for example, an ardent feminist
and a staunch "pro-lifer"-happen to disagree about the above outcome? The
latter approves, while the former sees it as a violation of the woman's
integrity and as reducing her to the demeaning status of "fetal container." Can
principlism help sort out, according to some canon of rational justification, the
rival "intuitions" of the disputing parties?
According to Clouser and Gert, these kinds of intuitive conflicts will only
be resolved on the higher plane of philosophical theory.51 Until the princi-
plists develop a more robust ethical theory, a theory that would ultimately
assign determinate weights to such competing values, these critics contend
that its resolutions of hard cases must remain ad hoe, fundamentally
unprincipled, and therefore unjustified. 2
Philosopher David DeGrazia has developed a more constructive critique of
principlism.5 3 While DeGrazia shares Clouser and Gert's worries about the
ad hoc and unprincipled character of the weighing and balancing required by
principlism, he adopts a strategy of amendment rather than abandonment.
Drawing on Henry Richardson's influential article on specification in moral
reasoning, 4 DeGrazia contends that in many hard cases what is really going
on is not the weighing and balancing of conflicting principles by unsupported
intuition, but rather the progressive specification of more abstract norms.
According to this view, initial abstract formulations of principles will become
increasingly concrete, specified, and delimited as one approaches the level of
the particular case. Thus, what begins as a straightforward, abstract, and
seemingly absolute principle-that women (and men) have a right to make
reproductive choices unfettered by government or medical profession-
als-might end as a complex and richly nuanced principle with built-in
exceptions for factors such as compromised rationality and severe and
irreversible harm, as in the above example. The advantage of thinking of
moral reasoning in terms of specification rather than balancing is, according
to DeGrazia and Richardson, that one's final practical judgments remain
49. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 32, at 228-47.
50. See Clouser & Gert, supra note 30; see also David DeGrazia, Moving Forward in Bioethical
Theory: Theories, Cases, and Specified Principlism, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 511 (1992).
51. Clouser & Gert, supra note 30.
52. Given the importance of this theoretically justified balancing scale for the principlist project,
one wonders why Clouser and Gert have not simply loaned one to Beauchamp and Childress.
53. DeGrazia, supra note 50.
54. Henry S. Richardson, SpecifJying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems, 19
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 279 (1990).
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tethered to a single principle capable of bestowing rational justification upon
them.5
Although DeGrazia's amendment to principlism is much richer than this
short synopsis will allow, and although his theory of moral justification
ultimately hinges on the sort of justification that reflective equilibrium
affords, 5 6 this particular aspect of his amendment simply redescribes, rather
than solves, the problem of indeterminacy. Indeed, the specter of indetermina-
cy that haunts the project of balancing within principlism threatens specifica-
tion as well. If weighing and balancing competing principles in the above
reproductive case falls short of rational justification for want of a hierarchy
of values that is theoretically justified, then the specification of abstract
principles through the process of reflective equilibrium will also fall short.
Just as the competing principles of reproductive autonomy and "nonmalefic-
ence" appear to require ad hoc, context specific, nuanced judgments
unsupported by higher level, lexically ordered principles, so too will efforts
to specify the principle of reproductive freedom down to the level of the
particular case. Indeed, what motivates and guides the modification and
specification of abstract principles, what compels one to lard them with
qualifying clauses, if not precisely the sort of countervailing values and
principles encountered by the principlist? Thus, whether one calls this
balancing or specification, the respective weights of competing considerations
must be sorted out. Unless DeGrazia has a rationally defensible, higher level,
lexical ordering principle at his disposal, his "specifiers" are in the same boat
as the principlists' "weighers and balancers." Neither, in short, can vindicate
the claim to rational justification that gave to principlism much of its initial
appeal.
Interpreting types of cases. Apart from the indeterminacies involved in
balancing and specifying principles, the corresponding moral situation requires
extensive, non-rule bound interpretation as well. In some contexts, this might
mean developing an appropriate moral vocabulary to describe what is
happening in certain kinds of situations. It seems that moral progress often
depends as much on finding (or fashioning) the right words as on applying the
right principles. This is especially the case in the areas of bioethical
investigation defined by rapid technological change-such as genetic
engineering, prenatal interventions on the fetus, and the withholding of life-
sustaining treatments. For example, the tentative search for compelling
descriptions has created much of the recent perplexity over the withholding
of artificial food and fluids. One questions what is really going on -in such
cases. Is the withholding of artificial nutrition through a nasogastric tube an
example of intentional "killing" or an example of a humble, merciful
withdrawal of ineffective medical treatments?
Those who breezily claim that bioethics is the application of principles to
"the facts" forget that, apart from the indices of bioethics periodicals, the
55. DeGrazia, supra note 50; Richardson, supra note 54.
56. That is, not on a straightforwardly foundationalist or deductivist approach.
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facts do not come neatly labelled. Cases and issues must be described,
individuated, and labelled well before any principles can be applied.
Interpreting the case. Even after developing a vocabulary to describe a
particular moral situation, the application of moral principles must await the
results of yet another layer of interpretation: the interpretation of actions,
gestures, and relationships within the case. Even if one decides that a specific
refusal of treatment does not necessarily amount to a form of suicide or
intentional killing, one still must determine the meaning of that refusal in the
context of its own setting and history. Indeed, some of the most illuminating
writing in the field of bioethics has dealt precisely with this type of searching
hermeneutic of the individual case.
Recall Robert Burt's brilliant and disturbing psychoanalytic interpretation
of a burn patient's adamant refusal to be treated and articulate request to
die. 7 While Burt acknowledged the validity of the principle of autonomy as
well as the sincerity of the patient's request to die, he enlarged the under-
standing of this case by attempting to place the patient's treatment refusal in
its emotional context. Perhaps, Burt suggested, the patient's refusal was less
an unambiguous thrust of freedom than a plea for recognition, acceptance, and
love from those surrounding him." Instead of being a statement, perhaps the
refusal was a question in disguise: "Do you still care for me? Would you
banish me from your sight?"
Clearly, the relevance of the principle of autonomy for this case depends
upon whether one interprets the patient's refusal as a statement or as a query.
For example, if the patient is in fact testing the commitment of those around
him, a mechanical application of the principle of autonomy to his expressed
refusal could lead to a tragic result. Whether or not one agrees with Burt's
controversial gloss on this case, his work shows that one can do creative and
exciting work in bioethics while paying scant attention to the analysis or
application of moral principles.
The search for moral justification through the application of principles thus
proves to be a far more complicated matter than the followers of principlism
appear to have initially discerned. While it still makes sense to talk about the
"application" of principles to cases, this application is no simple matter of
deduction but actually involves multiple layers of interpretation and
substantive moral reflection. The crucial point, however, is that each of these
interpretative layers-of the principles, of their relative weights, of case
description, and of the meaning of individual gesfures-is a locus of
interpretive conflict. Bioethics requires one to articulate and attempt to resolve
the conflicts at all of these levels. This is a difficult task. Reference to the
"application" of principles to cases tends to mask these difficulties. It gives
the impression that the task is "merely" one of intellectual procedure rather
than substance.
57. ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONS (1979).
58. Id. at 10-I I.
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Likewise, when people speak of this sort of "application" as justifying
particular moral judgments, they appear to assume that, from among a welter
of serious yet conflicting views at all levels, a justified choice must select the
correct principles, their correct formulation, their correct weight, the correct
typology of the situation, and the correct "reading" of the case details. This
assumption places inordinate demands upon the notion of moral justification,
especially since there are no clear and uncontested criteria for making
precisely these kinds of judgments.
This picture of what moral justification entails, a picture that early
confidence in principlism seems to have assumed, simply cannot bear the
weight that has been put on it. Indeed, as the principlist partisans of reflective
equilibrium now admit, the conception of moral justification as a correspon-
dence between individual judgments and theoretically validated moral
principles must be abandoned. In its place, a conception based upon the
overall coherence of our case-based judgments, mid-level principles, and
theoretical and cultural commitments would seem a more realistic goal. That
is, instead of seeking ultimate justification in an appeal to some rock solid,
freestanding principle, the quest should be for answers to how well an action
or policy comports with the considered judgments, principles, and values
already embedded in the web of our collective moral life.5 9 Sometimes such
an inquiry will yield a clear-cut answer, but most of the time it will create
genuine controversy that will be played out over time. Some arguments will
be more or less plausible, more or less rational than others. 6' They will
never, however, be purely objective "just like a science."
V. THE PARTICULARIST PROJECT IN BIOETHICS
As the initial promise of principlism began to fade, a small cluster of
alternative methodological approaches in bioethics emerged.6' They pressed
the critique of the dominant paradigm while attempting to articulate a more
"particularist" moral vision. Much of this critique has already been adumbrat-
ed in the short history of principlism. Examples include: the attack on the
reductionist and foundationalist aspirations of ethical theory, understood as
59. See MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987); see also GEORGIA
WARNKE, JUSTICE & INTERPRETATION (1993).
60. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIvISM (1983).
61. In addition to casuistry and narrative ethics, the two alternative methodologies that I shall
discuss, a complete account of challenges to principlism would have to include feminist theory as well.
Feminist theories in bioethics have much in common with casuistry and narrative ethics: All three
approaches are skeptical of standard ethical theories, attempt to root their moral analyses in the
particularities of complex situations, and give greater weight to the role of emotions and relationships
in moral life. While I would argue that feminist theory adds little, if anything, to the particularist critique
of principlism, feminist theorists have convincingly argued that the reigning paradigm of bioethics has
been insufficiently attentive to problems of power and domination. See, e.g.,FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
IN MEDICAL ETHICS (Helen B. Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992); SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER
PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE (1992); FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS: BEYOND
REPRODUCTION (S. Wolf ed., forthcoming 1994).
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some version of Kantianism or utilitarianism; 62 the insistence upon the
multiple layers of difficult interpretive work that are obscured by talk of
"applying" principles; and the dialectical role of cases in generating,
specifying, and reformulating ethical principles. My aim in this section is to
give a brief but more positive account of these new directions in bioethics.
Then, in conclusion, I will reflect on the implications of this methodological
shift for the role of case studies in the practice and teaching of bioethics.
A. Casuistry
The renaissance of casuistry, or case-based reasoning, in practical ethics has
stressed the pivotal role of cases while de-emphasizing the role of theory and
routinized appeals to "the principles of bioethics.1 63 According to its leading
proponents, a casuistical method must begin with a typology or grouping of
cases around a paradigm of a moral rule or principle. In the area of research
ethics, for example, the atrocities of Nazi medicine still are an exemplar of
unethical dealing with human subjects. From this signal case one then
branches out by a method akin to "moral triangulation" to analogous cases of
lesser or greater difficulty, such as research on children or the demented
elderly. As one proceeds from case to case responding to the particular
settings, treatments, and categories of research subjects, the principle becomes
increasingly refined and complex.
Crucially, the casuists contend that whatever "weight" a principle has vis-a-
vis competing principles, one must determine that weight, not in the abstract,
but in response to the details of individual cases.64 Suppose, for example, the
medical director of a reputable nursing home wishes to study the causes and
treatment of the refusal to eat by elderly patients with Alzheimer's disease.
Suppose further that informed consent to participate in the study cannot be
expected from this patient population. According to the dictates of our
paradigm case-for example, the infamous hypothermia experiments of the
Nazi doctors-the principle of respect for persons always requires the free and
informed consent of the research subject. According to the casuists, to
determine whether the principle of autonomy should prevail over the principle
of beneficence in nursing home research requires a more nuanced investiga-
tion into the "who" (enslaved ethnic populations vs. patients with Alzheimer's
disease), the "what" (lethal hypothermia experiments vs. studying and filming
patients' eating behaviors), the "where" (death camps vs. a regulated nursing
62. See, e.g., Barry Hoffmaster, Can Ethnography Save the Life of Medical Ethics?, 35 Soc. Scl.
& MED. 1421-31 (1992); Barry Hoffinaster, The Theory and Practice of Applied Ethics, 30 DIALOGUE
213-34 (1991).
63. See, e.g., BARUCH A. BRODY, LIFE AND DEATH DECISION MAKING (1988); JoNSEN & TOULMIN,
supra note 34; John D. Arras, Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics, 16 J. MED.
& PHIL. 29 (1991); see also A. Mackler, Cases and Judgments in Ethical Reasoning: An Appraisal of
Contemporary Casuistry and Holistic Model for the Mutual Support of Norms and Case Judgments
(1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University).
64. See Albert R. Jonsen, Of Balloons and Bicycles; or The Relationship Between Ethical Theory
and Practical Judgment, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 14.
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home with a competent research review board), and the "when" (after capture
and before execution vs. after the loss of capacity, the consent of family, and
approval and ongoing oversight of an ethics committee). Casuistry holds that
rather than assigning a timeless relative weight to a certain principle, details
should determine the weight. Thus, in this hypothetical, the facts and setting
of the proposed study might be so far removed from our paradigm of
unethical research that they justify moral approval even without the patient's
consent.
Presented in this way, the casuistical method obviously has much in
common with the method of the common law. Indeed, given the pivotal and
ubiquitous role of legal cases in the recent history of bioethics-a history
punctuated by such names as Karen Quinlan,6" Claire Conroy, 66 Nancy
Cruzan,67 Helga Wanglie, 6 and Baby M69-- it was entirely natural for
bioethicists to begin seeing parallels between case-based reasoning in ethics
and law. On both fronts, ethicists seem to reason from the "bottom up" (from
cases to fleshed-out principles) rather than from the "top down" (as most
versions of applied ethics imply). The principles themselves are consequently
"open textured" and always subject to further revision and specification, and
the final judgments usually turn on a fine-grained analysis of the particulari-
ties of the case.
To many working in the field, this account of reasoning in both ethics and
law accurately describes how ethicists actually think, both in clinical
situations and in the classroom. That is, they tend to think in terms of cases,
which serve as exemplars-a kind of shorthand for moral analysis and
assessment: "This is a Cruzan-type case, except here, instead of a feeding
tube, the issue is antibiotics" (or minimal conscious awareness, or a family
insisting that everything be done, etc.). How do these different facts alter
one's perception of the case? Are they so different as to dictate an alternative
result? Instead of ritualistically invoking the mantra, these ethicists propose
that normative accounts of ethical reasoning should more closely conform to
actual practices.
Just as the casuists insist that the weight of principles resides in the details,
so they insist that moral certainty resides in our responses to paradigmatic
cases, rather than in appeals to theory or principle. One is, in fact, much more
confident in the knowledge that torturing and killing Jews to learn about
hypothermia is wrong than in the assessment of which moral theory or
principles best describes why. One is much more likely to switch allegiance
to a different moral theory or conception of principles than to change his or
her mind about what the Nazi doctors did. Indeed, if an alternative moral
theory were to approve of the Nazis' experiments, most would reject the
theory based on that approval.
65. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
66. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
67. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
68. Wanglie v. Minnesota, 398 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
69. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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This emphasis on the case as the locus of moral certainty reveals an
important split within the casuistical camp. On the one hand, some "hard
core" casuists have little, if any, use for either principles or higher level
theory." According to this view, the principles invoked in moral argument
are nothing more than tidy summaries of moral thought as it grapples
analogically with cases. Such principles might serve as useful shorthand, these
critics concede, but they might also mislead by allowing one to impute
normative significance to mere summaries of what one has already decided.
This hard-core version of casuistry has little in common with the great
historical tradition of casuistry, and it presents a problematic account of moral
reasoning. As Jonsen and Toulmin's historical chapters on the rise and fall of
casuistry attest, the adherents of the casuistical method have always seen their
task as one of fitting the abstract principles of moral doctrine's sources, such
as the Bible, ancient philosophers, moral theology, or international law, to the
circumstances of cases.71
Moreover, doing without moral principles that not only summarize past
behavior but also guide future conduct may be the equivalent of throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. This radically anti-principlist stance derives its
plausibility from the fact that, according to the theory of reflective equilibri-
um, moral principles oiginate as summations of responses to experience of
particular cases. If this is so, one might reason, then it is intuitive responses
alone, not the principles, that do the real work in moral decision-making.
Moral principles, on this view, are thus nothing more than factual summaries
incapable of providing positive moral guidance.
This radically particularistic account of moral decision-making seems to
assume that if principles initially grow out of individual responses to
situations, then they will be incapable of transcending the domain of the
purely factual. But this assumption may give too much credit to the supposed
dichotomy between facts and values. The principles that gradually emerge
from one's experience with cases might be more profitably viewed as
repositories of congealed value judgments. They are expressions of what is
valued and disvalued in the world of moral experience. Thus, the principle of
confidentiality that prohibits health care providers from exposing the secrets
of their patients (apart from certain compelling exceptional circumstances) can
serve as a general, action-guiding norm: Unless you have a good reason, it is
generally wrong to violate a patient's confidence. It makes perfect sense to
say that such principles can and do guide deliberations in particular cases.
Even though general moral principles must usually be supplemented by a fine-
grained, particularistic assessment of a morally complex situation, they still
70. See, e.g., Stephen Toulmin, The Tyranny of Principles, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1981, at
31. Toulmin's position on principles is echoed by Richard Rorty who claims that the legacy of Hegel,
Marx, and Dewey is the realization that "the search for principle is a primitive stage of moral
development. What counts as moral sophistication is the ability to wield complex and sensitive moral
vocabularies, and thereby to create moral relevance." Richard Rorty, Method and Morality, in SOCIAL
SCIENCE AS MORAL INQUIRY 174 (Norma Haan et al. eds., 1983).
71. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 34, at 1-228.
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provide a kind of general orientation or moral compass. They provide, that is,
reasons for acting certain ways. In depriving ethicists of the grounds for this
kind of reason-giving, the radical particularists fundamentally distort one of
the most basic features of ordinary moral experience.
Another problem with this view is that it appears to embrace the dubious
notion that one can grasp the moral essence of individual cases through a kind
of "immaculate perception" unmediated by reference to general propositions.
It assumes that agents can traverse the field of their moral experience, moving
from case to case, unaided by appeals to principles, theory or other abstract
notions. The problem, however, is how one might decide to align any
particular case against a paradigm or series of precedent cases. In order to
determine that a certain case belongs to this line of cases rather than that, the
casuist will require norms, whether implicit or explicit, of moral relevance.
Thus, the casuist's efforts to categorize cases are necessarily "theory laden,"
at least in the sense that they implicate some kind of more general moral
appeal.72 Thus, following MacIntyre, one might say that cases elucidate
ethical "theory," while theory is a kind of story about how cases are to be
described.73
More moderate versions of casuistry make room for principles, theories, and
cultural norms, while still insisting on the priority of the particular. Instead
of imposing a false choice between responses to cases and principles, these
ethicists envision, in the words of Martha Nussbaum, a "process of loving
conversation between rules and concrete responses, general conceptions and
unique cases, in which the general articulates the particular and is in turn
further articulated by it."'74 These more general propositions play a role, but
rarely, if ever, as mere axioms from which moral conclusions might be
deduced. Whatever validity or usefulness these general notions might have
will depend upon the ethicist's insight, moral sensitivity, and casuistical skill
in applying them to a case.
At this point in the history of principlism and the emerging paradigm of
casuistry, it should be clear that these two approaches are not as antithetical
as their respective partisans often suggest. On the contrary, reformed
principlists who have abandoned deductivism and moderate casuists who
admit a role for principles and general notions could endorse Martha
Nussbaum's dictum with equal enthusiasm. Her dictum is, after all, just
another way of calling for reflective equilibrium between principles and cases.
72. See Aras, supra note 63.
73. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 7-11. For additional criticisms of "radical particularism," see
Jeffrey Blustein, Principlism and the Particularity Objection (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
74. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LovE's KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LrrERATURE 95
(1990).
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B. The Ascendancy of Narrative
The casuists' emphasis upon the particularities of moral situations is also
a recurring theme within the emerging literature of "narrative ethics.""
Although this classification harbors an array of writers with widely divergent
viewpoints on the relationship between ethics and stories, they would agree,
in common opposition to a top-down "applied ethics" model, that the story or
history is the most appropriate form of representing moral problems.
To support this claim, the partisans of narrative can point to the history of
contemporary bioethics, which is in a sense a history of the "big cases."
Whatever the so-called principles of bioethics might mean at this juncture,
they have achieved their meaning through collective reflection upon a set of
compelling stories. While the two dominant theoretical paradigms in ethics,
Kantianism and utilitarianism, have been consistently indifferent or hostile to
the role of narrative in ethical reasoning, the field of bioethics has moved the
story or case study to center stage.
While some partisans of narrative ethics advance very strong and controver-
sial claims,76 I think all would agree that a complete story or history is a
prerequisite to any responsible moral analysis. Before one can attempt to
judge, one must understand, and the best way to understand is to tell a
nuanced story.
Thus, to debate the issue of assisted suicide, for example, one should not
rely on abstract, asocial, and timeless propositions, but rather begin within the
context of a full-bodied case. Dr. Timothy Quill's well-known case study of
Diane, a patient requesting assisted suicide, provides an excellent illustration
of this narrative approach." Instead of focusing on the derivation and
specification of principles, Dr. Quill gives us a rich picture of the "players"
and their characters. First, there was Diane, a courageous but fearful cancer
patient seeking control of her dying process, a woman who had already
overcome a previous cancer threat and her own debilitating alcoholism. Next,
there was Dr. Quill himself, a competent and clearly compassionate physician
torn between loyalties to his patient and professional ethics, a man courageous
enough to "take small risks for people [he] really know[s] and care[s]
about."78 Then Dr. Quill explores the roles that the players occupy: a doctor
trained to preserve life rather than end it; a patient who is also a wife, mother,
and respected friend. He tells us about their prior and ongoing relationship:
how he had witnessed and rejoiced when Diane triumphed over adversity, and
75. See, e.g., HOWARD BRODY, STORIES OF SICKNESS (1987); ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE (1984); NUSSBAUM, supra note 74; Margaret U. Walker, Keeping Moral Spaces Open: New
Images of Ethics Consulting, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 33; David Burrell and Stanley
Hauerwas, From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality in Ethics, in KNOWLEDGE,
VALUE, AND BELIEF 111-52 (H.T. Englehardt, Jr. & Daniel Callahan eds., 1977).
76. Nussbaum, for example, argues that narrative is the only proper medium for some philosophical
issues. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 74, at 3.
77. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
78. Id. at 694.
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how he anguished with her over the current threat. He describes his own
doubts and hopes for Diane's future and the future of their relationship. He
wonders whether prescribing a lethal dose might restore her spirits and give
her more emotional comfort in her final struggle. He also alludes to the
institutional and social context, albeit in my opinion not sufficiently,79 with
references to the current state of the law.
Although a reconstructed principlist might object at this point that all the
above matters can and should be folded into a principlistic analysis as
components of "the case," I think it remains true that the partisans of moral
theory and principlism have not given many of these issues their due. This is
especially true of Quill's concern to sketch the moral character of his players,
the nature of their past and future relationships, and the fine details of their
institutional and social context. As Bernard Williams has argued, most
received moral theories operate with impoverished or empty conceptions of
the individual.80 To bring the moral individual into clearer focus, he claims,
one must attend to his or her differential particularity, to the desires, needs,
and "ground projects" that coalesce into the character of the person. But if
one is concerned with the depiction, understanding, and assessment of
character, one can do so only by telling and retelling stories."'
Finally, note that there is an important pedagogical value of narrative
approaches to ethics. A common thread uniting these "new paradigms" in
bioethics is their emphasis upon particularity-of persons, character,
situations, and histories. Both the casuists and narrativists insist that if one is
to "do ethics" well, one must be, in the words of Henry James echoed by
Martha Nussbaum, "finely aware and richly responsible"82 to precisely these
particularities.
It may be that the study of ethical theories and a concern for properly
defining and specifying principles will make one a better judge of moral
problems and policies. But without an equal if not greater concern for the
particularities and nuances of specific situations, the "applied ethicist" will be
operating as if in the dark. One very important way for students of morality,
both young and old, to acquire and refine this sensitivity is to encounter
complex narratives of real or fictional characters, situations, and events.
Whereas philosophers' examples and at least one philosopher's 3 fiction tend
to present narratives clearly in the service of some doctrine or rule, stories
cultivate, in Nussbaum's fine phrase, "our ability to see and care for
79. Indeed, in my opinion, Quill's major failing is to have inadequately considered the implications
of introducing the practice of assisted suicide within the context of a society that fails to provide
adequate health care, including pain relief and treatment for depression, to millions of potential
candidates.
80. Bernard Williams, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1, 1-19 (1981).
81. For a more fully developed statement of the fit between narrative and the depiction of character,
see TOBIN SIEBERS, MORALS AND STORIES 15 (1992).
82. NusSBAUM, supra note 74, at 148.
83. See generally SARTRE, supra note 8.
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particulars, not as representatives of a law, but as what they themselves are
"84
VI. THE ROLE OF CASES RECONSIDERED
What are the implications of these challenges to the reigning paradigm for
the understanding and use of case studies? As has been seen, the "applied
ethics" movement, while continuing the long tradition of viewing cases as
mere illustrations of more theoretical propositions, began to envision cases as
problems in their own right that required the assistance of philosophical
theory. The particularist critique of this "applied ethics" model suggests two
additional roles for case studies within the practice and teaching of bioethics.
First, the critique of deductivism, endorsed now by reformed principlists and
casuists alike, assigns an important role to cases in the dialectic of reflective
equilibrium. Instead of viewing cases as entirely subordinate to theory and/or
principles, there is now common agreement that cases provide the considered
judgments from which principles eventually evolve. There is also widespread
agreement that while principles may continue to exercise normative force over
judgments in particular cases, those very judgments can serve to test, specify,
and even disprove particular formulations of principle and theory.
The analysis and assessment of case studies thus assumes a much more
integral role in the process of moral reflection and theorizing than either the
standard applied ethics model or the philosophical tradition had envisioned.
Indeed, in such a constructivist model the very notion of "applied ethics" is
redundant, since all ethics is "applied" in the sense that it grows out of
particularities and is constantly tethered to them in a process of perpetual
readjustment.
A second new role for case studies within particularized bioethics is to
serve as a laboratory for students and teachers alike to learn how to perceive,
comprehend, and judge ethically. Whereas the more mechanistic variants of
applied ethics simply assumed that all the ethical heavy lifting went into the
formulation of theory and principles and that the process of "application" was
only a matter of bringing factual particulars under the rule of normative
principle, the emerging paradigms in bioethics draw attention to neglected
aspects of moral reasoning and to skills that can be developed and nurtured
through narratives and case analysis. Importantly, again in contrast to the
nearly exclusive emphasis on principles and rule-governed behavior within
applied ethics, most of these skills are not rule-governed and do not fit within
a paradigm based upon a correspondence theory of ethical truth.
Consider, for example, what I have elsewhere called the skill of "moral
diagnosis. '"85 The very first step in moral analysis is the question: "What
kind of case is this?" Confronted with a particular case, one must immediately
84. NusSBAUM, supra note 74, at 184.
85. Alan R. Fleischman & John D. Arras, Teaching Medical Ethics in Perinatology, 14 CLINICS IN
PERINATOLOGY 395 (1987).
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start casting about for an appropriate general description. Since cases do not
come pre-labelled, and since different observers can and do disagree about
what certain cases are "really about," an essential part of one's "moral
education" should involve the process of "diagnosing" morally problematic
aspects of cases. Although some judgments are clearly better than others in
this domain, the process is anything but rule-governed. Indeed, it requires a
great deal of moral imagination and creativity to plot where the most
important problems lie or to reframe the terms of a protracted debate in a way
that both sides can accept and use as the platform for a fruitful compro-
mise."
The development of this sort of diagnostic skill or art is crucial in clinical
and policy settings, especially in view of the temptation for consultant
ethicists to simply accept at face value the presuppositions of professionals
in their labelling of cases. Although I am not advocating a return to heavily
theory-driven examples and cases, it is naive to think that moral problems
exist independently of theory, broadly understood to encompass views of the
good, principles, virtues, or professional ideology. Without careful attention
to developing this skill of collaborative moral diagnosis, consultant ethicists
will be reduced to playing the role of Jeeves to their respective employers.
In addition to the art of moral diagnostics, exposure to cases and narratives
fosters other non-rule-governed skills crucial to ordinary moral reasoning. As
Martha Nussbaum emphasizes, exposure to stories (especially the novels of
Henry James) develops the ability to discern the particularities of morally
charged situations, to be "finely aware and richly responsible.""7 Likewise,
observing skilled clinical casuists at work can hone one's capacities for
analogical reasoning-the engine that drives most practical reasoning-and for
judiciously weighing and balancing competing values. Finally, exposure to
case studies can acquaint students of ethics with various practical strategies
for coping with risk and *uncertainty," and with exemplars of morally
necessary (and unnecessary) compromise among equally well-informed and
well-meaning participants. 9
86. During the course of a heated case conference in our Intensive Care Unit ("ICU") at Montefiore
Medical Center regarding a case involving a family's request to wind down aggressive treatments, my
colleague Nancy Dubler made the suggestion that this case was "really" about how to offer a patient
hospice care in the context of an ICU. Both sides of the argument, those who favored the gradual
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and those who opposed it on the ground that the mission of the
ICU is to provide precisely this kind of aggressive care, welcomed this "reframing" of the issue as a
way out of their quagmire. There is nothing nile-governed about this skill; it grows out of experience,
imagination, and good judgment.
87. NusSBAUM, supra note 74, at 148.
88. Nancy K. Rhoden, Treating Baby Doe: The Ethics of Uncertainty, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Aug. 1986, at 34.
89. MARTIN BENJAMIN, SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: COMPROMISE AND INTEGRITY IN ETHics AND
POLITICS (1990).
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VII. THE RECALCITRANT PATIENT RECONSIDERED
To bring the form of this Article into closer conformity with its point, I
shall conclude with a case and commentary that illustrate the value of
enhanced particularity for ethical analysis. The case concerns the same
recalcitrant TB patient encountered earlier, presented this time with a
semblance of the detail demanded by the "emerging paradigms" in bioethics:
The patient AB is a 42 year old Hispanic male. He has known that he
is HIV-positive since 1989. He has been and continues to be an intravenous
drug user. He was found by the Emergency Medical Service team in early
April 1992, wandering and disoriented with a tourniquet still attached to
his arm. He was brought to the hospital to rule out TB and endocarditis
because of an active cough and a temperature of 105 degrees.
Upon admission to the hospital, the patient's previous admissions
were not immediately discovered because his two prior chart histories in
the record room were linked to two different names and sets of personal
data. Because of his admitting condition, however, and an X-ray that
showed severe upper lobe infiltrates, he was placed in a single room and
initially begun on INH, RIF, PZA, and EMB.
Once the patient's medical history was reconstructed from the
previous admissions, he was shown to have had two .admissions in the
previous three months and to be HIV-positive. He had received three or
four weeks of therapy during that time, although none of it was consecu-
tive. TB had been first diagnosed in January, it was sensitive to all drugs.
A drug-resistant strain was confirmed upon sputum culture in March during
his second admission; the organism was identified as resistant to INH and
PZA. Upon the third admission, as on the prior two admissions, AB was
placed in a negative pressure isolation room and ordered not to leave this
space. When his prior drug sensitivities became available, he was placed
on a six-drug regimen that included parenteral amikacin.
The patient refused to stay in his room. He had been promised that
a television and a telephone would be connected. When neither happened,
he went in search of both. He also complained that the room was very cold
and uncomfortable. After he had been found in the elevators and in the
lobby of the hospital, the nurses took away his clothes. He was again found
-wandering in the hall. At that point the resident on duty called the guard
and had the patient handcuffed to the bed by his hands and feet. He was
also "posied", confined by a bed jacket with straps that were tied to the
bed.
The room was in fact quite cold, as is often the case with negative
pressure, highly ventilated rooms. In addition, blankets were in very short
supply in the hospital. As some patients were being given a stack of sheets
in lieu of blankets, the nurses did not feel that they could give this
particular patient more blankets. Even if the supply had been adequate,
staff might not have been forthcoming. Once he had been gowned, cuffed,
and posied, AB was quite cold and miserable.
The next morning after the patient had been released from restraints
for breakfast and was again found in the lobby, the resident called for a
guard and asked the Department of Health for a detention order; it was
issued.
During this time the staff caring for the patient had no special
protections. No "microspore" masks were available. The rumor in the
hospital was that some would be available soon. The most effective masks,
however, would be available only for special technicians such as those
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doing induced sputum cultures. Masks at the next level of effectiveness
would be available to the general staff. At this point, none were available
except for those "liberated" from a nearby hospital. The resident in charge
of the patient was pregnant and very afraid of contracting TB; she had,
therefore, not actually seen or spoken to him.
Once the detention order was issued, the hospital placed the patient
under "one-to-one" surveillance with a guard beside the door at all times.
The cost of such supervision is approximately $100,000 per year.
Once the guard had been posted, the patient began refusing medica-
tions selectively. Some of the refusals seemed random. Some, however,
were comprehensible. For example, he refused to take amikacin. The
administration of this medication can be either intramuscular or intrave-
nous. Assuming that there were no available veins to administer the drug
intravenously, the staff had begun the intramuscular administration that he
regularly refused because of the pain and discomfort. They then discovered
that it was, indeed, possible to administer the medication intravenously. He
did not refuse the medication in this form.
Approximately one week after admission, AB was shifted to a
different single room that was less cold. He was also provided with a
television and a working telephone. After four weeks of treatment, his
fever abated, and he felt much better. He began to talk about leaving the
hospital. He also began pulling out the intravenous drips used to administer
the amikacin. His last three smears were negative, but his X-ray continued
to show a large upper lobe infiltrate.9"
In the first encounter with Mr. AB, the issue was simple: Should the patient
be permitted to roam the corridors and lobby of the hospital where he might
infect others with a potentially lethal strain of TB, or should he be forcibly
detained in his room or, if necessary, on his bed? While the above "thicker"
description of the case poses the same question, it reveals particularities about
the patient's life in the hospital and his relations with others that might
fundamentally alter one's attitude towards the case and the patient.
The second version of the case tells the story of a patient who exists, and
is expected to tolerate existing, in near total isolation from the outside world.
He has no phone, no radio, and no TV. Because his virulent strain of TB
might be easily communicated to the staff, Mr. AB's own physician, a
pregnant resident, refuses to enter his room. In addition, his room is now
described as exceedingly cold and uncomfortable. Blankets would help, but
they are unavailable. This is, after all, a chronically underfunded and ill-
equipped public hospital. Clothes would help too, but they have been taken
away by nurses to prevent him from wandering.
The relationship between Mr. AB and the hospital nursing staff emerges as
a distinct theme in the second version. It is a terrible relationship. Mr. AB is
no doubt acting in an irresponsible and disrespectful manner towards the
nurses, and the nurses regard him, an HIV-infected drug abuser, as the classic
"hateful patient." The narrative implies that even if the nurses had the
90. NANcY DUBLER ET AL., A SPEcIAL REPORT, THE TUBERCULOSIS REVIVAL: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND SOCIETAL OBLIGATIONS IN A TIME oF AIDS app. C, at 33-34 (United Hospital Fund of New York,
1992).
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requisite blankets, they may not have given him some, just to punish him for
his ongoing bad behavior.
The second narrative better details the handling of this difficult patient. It
spells out in graphic detail exactly what it means for public health concerns
to prevail over individual liberty on the floors of this particular hospital. In
order to neutralize Mr. AB as a threat to the health of others, he is stripped
of his clothing, placed in four point "restraints" (or handcuffs), and posied to
the bed. The second account also shows that the patient may not be the
irrational maniac suggested by the first description. After he finally gets a
new room and some conveniences to occupy his time, he begins to cooperate
with his treatment regimen, and some of his aversions are found to have a
rational basis: they hurt and other modalities are available.
The thicker account of the case prompts reflection on additional ethical
issues. The first issue concerns the meaning of this patient's "noncompliance."
The first version does not explain his behavior; the second, expanded version
allows one to comprehend and to "deconstruct" the notion of noncompliance.
Mr. AB belongs to a class of patients who combine drug use with HIV-
infection and TB. Many are homeless and impoverished; most who are
noncompliant tend to manifest definite psychiatric disturbances. In the stressed
and chaotic setting of the urban, public hospital, the needs of such patients
often go unmet. With the lack of adequate social and medical supports, it is
not surprising that people like Mr. AB have trouble cleaving to an extraordi-
narily strenuous and demanding medical regimen.
Who is to blame for Mr. AB's situation-Mr. AB or the social system that
makes it nearly impossible for him to succeed? Seen through the "thick"
account, the patient's "noncompliance" reveals an unnoticed social dimension
of utmost importance both for individual patient care and social policy.
The second set of issues flagged by the thicker description concerns the
relationships between Mr. AB and his health care providers. Although nurses,
at least in my limited experience, generally tend to be more caring and
compassionate with patients than physicians, the nurses in this case may have
crossed the line between understandable exasperation with a difficult case and
patient abuse. It is one thing to resent the hostile, noncompliant, and
dangerous behavior of a patient, but it is something else again to strip him of
his clothes in a frigid room, strap him down, and force toxic antibiotics into
his body. This episode prompts one to reflect upon how powerful emotional
responses can cloud judgment and interfere with professional behavior.
A related issue posed by this version of the case concerns the limits of
one's professional obligation to treat difficult or dangerous patients. For the
medical team, Mr. AB presents a triple threat: he is a potentially violent drug
abuser, is HIV-infected, and is the host of a drug-resistant strain of TB. While
the first two threats do not prevent most health care providers from attending
to such patients, the third posed a serious problem for Mr. AB's pregnant
resident physician.
What are the limits of professional obligation, especially for pregnant
professionals, when confronted by serious health risks? In considering this,
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also recall the additional element of this case: This hospital failed to provide
its physicians and nurses with the kinds of masks needed to protect them-
selves against the deadly strain of TB. Can the hospital expect its physicians
and nurses to fulfill their ethical obligations to patients when it has not
provided them with adequate protection? Again, a thicker description reveals
the distinct social dimensions of the problem.
Finally, this more robust account of Mr. AB demonstrates the danger for
ethical analysis of relying exclusively on certain actors' pictures of "the case."
For example, relying on the housestaff and nurses probably would have
produced a picture resembling the first sketch. With this limited picture, one
sees the patient's vexing and dangerous behavior, but misses the additional
issues the second sketch reveals. Thus, the testimony of social workers
familiar with society's shocking neglect of such patients is welcome and
necessary. To be sure, the perspectives of physicians and nurses involved in
a case are indispensable in the construction of an adequate story, but they
only provide a part of the story. To develop a larger psychological, social, and
ethical context, the ethicist-consultant must actively participate in the
development of "the case," rather than play the role of a passive recipient of
professionals' stories.
CONCLUSION
What is the role of cases and case studies within the discipline of bioethics?
This survey of the emergence of "applied ethics" and of the challenge of "new
paradigms" reveals different answers to this question that reflect different
conceptions of moral inquiry.
The philosophical tradition, with few exceptions, makes use of "examples"
designed to illustrate theory, but has no use for case studies as we know them.
The "applied ethics" movement in its early, "heroic" phase embraced case
studies not merely as another vehicle for exemplifying theory, but as real-life
problems to be solved with the aid of philosophical theory and moral
principles.
The critiques of "applied ethics" and principlism by the partisans of
casuistry and narrative ethics have further expanded the importance and role
of case studies. For the casuists, cases provide the considered judgments and
paradigms from which moral principles ultimately are derived and to which
they must remain faithful within the creative tension of reflective equilibrium.
Cases also put flesh on abstract moral principles, giving them concrete
meaning, weight, and specificity. For the partisans of narrative, cases or
stories provide the best window into the phenomenon of moral character while
sharpening our ability to see particulars, "not as representatives of a law, but
as what they themselves are . . . ." ' For both casuists and narrativists, cases
provide a laboratory for the development and nurturing of many important
non-rule-governed aspects of moral reflection, such as the ability to reframe
91. NUSSBAUM, supra note 74, at 184.
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and diagnose moral problems, to reason by analogy, and to engage in the
judicious weighing and balancing of competing principles and values in
concrete circumstances.
This shift towards the particular as the focus of moral inquiry has been
accompanied by a parallel movement towards a different conception of moral
justification. The applied ethics movement began in a powerful burst of
enthusiasm for theory as the ultimate warrant for the rectitude of moral
judgments. With the waning of this theory-driven, top-down, deductivist
model of moral reasoning, justification was sought in moral principles derived
through a process of reflective equilibrium. Instead of viewing moral
justification as a question of correspondence between case judgments and the
correct moral principle, justification is now sought in the overall coherence
among case judgments, principles, cultural values, and ideals.
Implicit in this shift from correspondence to coherence is a parallel shift in
emphasis from the individual to the social group as the focus of moral
justification. Instead of searching for moral justification in a connection
between an individual's judgment and some objective, universal, moral
principle or theory, the particularist paradigms point, either implicitly or
explicitly, to the social group as the ultimate "ground" or "foundation" of
moral truth. Just as Thomas Kuhn has argued that the authority of scientific
judgments resides in the consensus of its practitioners-that there is no
transcendent warrant for different pictures of the world or scientific
paradigms 9 2-recent developments in bioethics also point to consensus within
the community of inquirers, which includes the professions and the general
public, as the ultimate but provisional warrant for actions and policies.93
As good Kuhnian paradigms, these particularist movements generate new
problems as they challenge old methods. Perhaps foremost among these are
the problems of critique and intercultural conflict. Just a few words about
each may be in order before closing.
The great virtue of deductivism and of principlism in its early days of
methodological slumber was their ability to criticize paternalistic assumptions
and practices deeply embedded in the medical community. Of course, the
norms on which this critique was based-such as respect for persons, for
truth-telling, and justice-did not come from some detached realm of moral
truth. Even if they were not embedded in medical practice, they belonged to
the moral vocabulary of the larger society, where all the patients lived. What
is one's response, however, when skeptics challenge the received wisdom and
moral consensus of this larger society? What is the response when, for
example, a long line of cases, developed casuistically and analogically, seems
headed in the wrong direction? What should be done, in other words, about
the problem of "bad coherence"? 94
92. Gary Gutting, Paradigms and Hermeneutics: A Dialogue on Kuhn, Rorty, and the Social
Sciences, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 4 (1984).
93. JONATHAN MORENO, THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE: BIOETHICS AND MORAL CONSENSUS
(forthcoming 1995).
94. Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1710 (1990).
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This old question continues to haunt the partisans of particularism, including
pragmatists and communitarians. One response, explored by Michael Walzer,
is to emphasize the richness and diversity of most developed cultures, which
usually harbor wiihin themselves sufficient resources for vigorous critiques
of existing assumptions and arrangements.95 Another suggestion, offered by
Tom Beauchamp at this Symposium, is that this task of correcting misguided
casuistical analysis naturally falls to moral principles.96 Indeed, Beauchamp
argued that a continuing emphasis upon principles is necessary in order to
steer casuistical analysis in the right direction.97 In any case, the partisans
of particularity need to grapple more carefully with this problem.
A related issue facing these new paradigms in bioethics is the problem of
identifying the "we" that is the subject of moral consensus and devising ways
of mediating conflicts between competing communities of inquiry and
meaning. In the early years of the "applied ethics" movement, it was basically
assumed that the so-called principles of bioethics were objective, timeless, and
universal. Given the intellectual indebtedness of this movement to utilitarian-
ism and Kantianism-two theories that fancied themselves as being objective
in this sense-this was a thoroughly predictable assumption. The more one
probes the particularities of different communities and cultures, however, the
more likely one will discern differences in the meaning and weight of various
moral principles, values, and ideals-differences that tend to preclude the kind
of consensus sought.
Who, then, shall count as a member of the "community of inquiry"? A
seventeen-year-old Latina, infected with HIV, who wishes to have a child in
spite of the thirty percent risk of infecting her offspring with a lethal disease?
Is her behavior "rational" or "responsible" according to her community? Is it
rational according to "ours"? In case of a disagreement, how should one
proceed?
Although a precarious consensus has emerged on a surprising number of
bioethical issues, one must be alert to the fact that a heightened sensitivity to
social and cultural particularity will often subvert consensus rather than foster
95. WALZER, supra note 59, at 39, 50.
96. Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.L 955,
962-66 (1994).
97. Id. Although I agree with Tom Beauchamp that principles may serve as a beacon for casuistical
analysis-along with notions of the good life, virtues, cultural commitments, etc.-I am skeptical of his
claim that principles will be especially useful in keeping casuistical reasoning on the straight and
narrow. In the first place, as I have discussed, the way of ethical truth, mediated as it is by community
and consensus, is neither particularly straight nor narrow. In many instances in bioethics, the ultimate
question seems to be: "What kind of life are we forging together?", rather than: "Is this particular
approach, for example, to reproductive technologies, morally correct?". Second, since our principles in
large measure stem from our considered judgments about particular cases, they are likely to be
"infected" by the same misguided casuistry they are supposed to correct. (The fault will often lie in our
considered judgments. The Greeks, for example, found slavery to be perfectly natural.) And third, there
is no reason to think that the existence and invocation of moral principles will necessarily serve as
reliable correctives regarding moral truth. Casuists have no natural advantage over principlists in their
ability to generate bad lines of case judgments. Having moral principles at your disposal does not
guarantee that you will "apply" them well. Until principles are joined to the particularities of cases, they
will remain abstract "chapter headings" capable of "justifying" contradictory case interpretations.
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it. Partisans of the new paradigms of bioethics must prepare to meet this new
challenge.
